Circumstances have conspired to render the conservation movement curiously diffident in the expression of the fundamental beliefs that underpin it. 'Oppositional' activists assume their case as proven, while 'institutional' tacticians tend to adopt the point of view of those they oppose, deploying utilitarian/economic arguments. The latter arguments represent an unstable long-term option because they are an inadequate defence against compelling forces of corrosion and corruption. On present evidence, in a few hundred years the planet will be devoid of major natural areas, and the quality of human life will have been utterly compromised. A more honest admission that the natural world is an inalienable component of the human capacity to experience freedom (which is also a mental circumstance) would transform the way we treat the natural environment and hence the prospects for the long-term survival of biological diversity.
Charities and agencies devoted to good works generally have little need of justifying themselves to the larger public, whose interests and concerns they broadly reflect, and in many cases wildlife conservation is accepted and understood without hesitation for providing an important service to mankind. Conservationists themselves are widely perceived as benign and generous people, committing their careers to a regime of low pay, long hours, high stress and worthyeven if, in some estimations, essentially lost -causes. By and large they are liked for their endeavours and their public-spiritedness.
Nevertheless, their status is somewhat ambiguous. Eccentric career choices predicate eccentric careerists, and the conservationist spectrum, with its broad green centre flanked by an indelible deep blue and a volatile bright red, forms a coalition of types that are peculiarly vulnerable to caricature. Moreover, though the conservation cause be estimable, it is not generally to be ranked alongside the greater immediate struggles for human health, wealth and rights (struggles that are better expressed in the negative -against disease, poverty and political repression). Conservation is oddly disadvantaged because the benefits it brings to mankind are seemingly so much more oblique and less tangible than the benefits that flow from what it so frequently seeks (or seems) to oppose. Indeed, where the interests of conservation and human welfare are perceived to be in direct conflict, an almost universal sense of scandalized revulsion attaches to the idea that animals or habitats or landscapes might ever be thought to have legitimacy over people.
This disadvantage has compounded, and been compounded by, a desperate and sometimes excruciating inability on the part of the conservation movement to articulate the most basic truth about its motivation. In trying to express the nature of this circumstance, the image that comes to mind is that of a scrambling plant. The growth of the conservation movement in the past hundred years has seen the convolution of simple, clear causes (elephants, whales, chimpanzees, etc.) into a complex, obscure mesh of interrelated, interdependent activities and principles (protected area management, environmental impact assessment, sustainable utilization, etc.). The core of the movement has become solid and static and unregarded, while new simple causes push on upward, proliferate and draw appreciation from many eyes; and of course, as long-suffering conservation executives know only too well, it is the unregarded, unspectacular core that is so desperately hard to fund. This is the point of the metaphor: the flowersthe simple causes -continue blithely to make their own exquisite advocacy, and need no words to demonstrate their worth, while the sclerotic older stems -the institutions, their systems and core costs -offer nothing visible to recommend them, and need to have their relevance accounted for in the dullest and most technical of terms.
The community of conservationists reflects this duality in the way NGOs fall, very roughly, into two broad types, the 'oppositional' -typically young, small, outspoken, provocative --which fight for nature against forces of exploitation on the basis of a dominant emotional certitude built around the simple, clear ideas expressed by no and stop ; and the 'institutional' -typically established, large, circumspect, persuasivewhich work for nature, in part with the forces of exploitation, in the belief that the complex, hazy ideas of partnership, dialogue and accommodation tend ultimately to confer greater influence over events than placards, banners and name-calling. The matter is, however, as much one of risk as of principle: the oppositional strategy, taking purity as its standard, is prepared to risk losing everything; the institutional strategy, taking practicality as its standard, is prepared to diminish that risk by accepting the loss of something .
Consequently we find that oppositional conservationists, working with each other and not needing to engage the enemy in dialogue or debate, tend to assume their case speaks for itself, the way a flower has its own incontrovertible appeal. Many of them appear to be locked into their own certainties and decisions, disengaged from consumerist society, and disinclined to articulate in language what they feel they adequately express in behaviour. When required to argue for a species to be preserved, for example, an oppositional conservationist is likely simply to assert, as a given, that 'extinction is wrong'; when pressed on why, at the root of it, it is wrong, the answer is still unlikely to progress beyond 'mankind does not have the right to destroy other life' or 'species have as much right to live as we do', blanket assertions that at best appeal to conscience (sadly not an entity on which any durable system of environmental management can be based) and ultimately do no more than express a fragile and disputable opinion -which is, in reality, little better than saying nothing at all.
By contrast, institutional conservationists, working as they do with, and not against, bodies -governments, agencies, businesses, communities -which often have quite different agendas and varying degrees of sympathy and antipathy to nature, have been compelled to develop an array of tactical arguments that they deploy in the quest for favour and acceptance. Confronted with the species preservation challenge, institutional conservationists become contortionists as they sedulously rehearse their reasons, such as 'species are parts of our life-support systems' (ecosystems will collapse without them) and 'species possess unknown potential benefits to man' (the cure for cancer is out there somewhere) and 'species indicate the health of our environment' (the early warning canary is deep in its coalmine). However true these points are, and however relevant and valuable they may be, there is nonetheless something peculiarly humiliating about them, because at heart we all know that they do not capture the depth of feeling that motivates us in our interventions and endeavours, and therefore do not reflect why ultimately any of us really care about biodiversity.
So we have this major disability of self-expression, manifest as slogan-based self-certainty on the one side and silvertongued ingratiation on the other. The tension between the two has doubtless always been there, but in recent years the influence of the latter has greatly extended. Very roughly speaking, it was around 1980, the year of the publication of Agenda 2000 and the World Conservation Strategy , that the major shift occurred. Myers (1979) had just published The sinking ark , a book of revelations over the scale of the anthropogenic extinctions that habitat loss predicted, and over the extraordinary economic potential many wild species of plant possess. The main effect of this book was to reinforce the crying need for a more objective and comprehensive assessment of the plight of the world and its wildlife; but it also inevitably prompted the recognition of a second need, for a more detached and professionalized managerial response to the situation.
Thus, on the one hand, the emphasis shifted to ecosystem conservation and to the rationalization of protected area systems (and it was about this time that, in seeking to draw back from close-focus species-level thinking, that the term 'biological diversity' and its portmanteau was coined), but on the other, this very shift produced an increasing managerial hostility to 'uneconomic' (mainly therefore species-based) projects. Myers had discussed the idea that some species might have to be allowed to die out (' triage '), and this was naturally, albeit informally and tacitly, picked up by those of a laissez-faire persuasion within the conservation movement (almost inevitably, of course, the managers). The fact that this was also the start of a period of ascendancy in hardcore economic liberalism (Margaret Thatcher, 1979 -1990 , Ronald Reagan, 1980 -1988 was not entirely coincidental. Lurking seriously in the subtext of much managerial behaviour throughout the 1980s was the notion that the survival of all endangered species has a cost which they (the species themselves), or their hard-pressed conservation advocates, would somehow have to defray.
The World Conservation Strategy was a landmark document: first because it sought to integrate the conservation and utilization of natural resources in a rational scheme of global development, and second because it was issued by (then) the world's two most powerful global conservation institutions, WWF and IUCN. Its great strength was that it sought to put conservation at the heart of the global development agenda. Its great weakness was that it put conservation into the hands of the global development agenda. Its emphasis on the utilitarian value of wildlife, as if this was somehow a triumph of mature thinking, was in reality a calculated sacrifice of authenticity. Within a very short period, the concept of conservation for development had come into being (IUCN operated a centre bearing this name, 1981-1987) , and the servant/victim identity of conservation had been reinforced and, worse, formalized.
Whatever the merits and achievements of the economic or utilitarian valuation of wildlife as a basis of its conservation, it has at least three cardinal drawbacks. The first and most important is that it masks the way we really value it, and thus builds what at heart I can only describe as dishonesty and regrettably even cynicism into the very fabric of the conservation mission. The second is that it is a relative value, subject, like share prices, to the vagaries of fashion and circumstance. The third is that it tends to accept the problems thrown up by human development as merely technical ones to which nature, if only properly harnessed, can offer an appropriate emollient. Certainly it cannot be said, with great confidence, to have worked: the utilitarian properties of nature have been vaunted all round the world for two decades now, and all round the world animal and plant populations are under siege as never before from the intemperate, insatiable forces that either openly represent or are the inadvertent by-product of the supposedly benign and necessary entity called 'human development'.
That it at least had the chance to work has recently been shown by Oates (1998) , who witnessed at first hand the repeated expropriation of conservation projects into development portfolios, and the negative consequences this had. The biologists whose commitment and concern lay behind the initiation of many conservation projects in West Africa came to be marginalized in a process whereby people of dubious relevant qualification were recruited to operate those projects under the prevailing ideology that framed wildlife conservation as a business enterprise. Simple low-cost measures to protect monkeys and other vanishing wildlife were persistently ignored in favour of large high-cost projects whose primary purpose appeared to be (and whose primary effect evidently was) to 'pay handsome salaries to foreign consultants'. In what is at times a remarkably restrained commentary, Oates concluded that 'the transformation of conservation to an economic activity has been deeply corrupting, and is the primary reason why so many conservation projects have failed in what should be their chief mission: safeguarding the long-term future of threatened communities of plants and animals'.
I would characterize the process Oates refers to less as corruption than corrosion, which conveys the sense that the driving force is not so much conspiracy as absence of context ('cock-up') . Corrosion is what happens when things are not clear, when principles are not fully enunciated and understood. It allows interpretations and behaviours to multiply and diverge, including both naked and precautionary selfinterest. That different and often diametrically opposite effects to those expected should result is a phenomenon that calls to mind Ehrenfeld's (1978) argument, 20 years earlier, that humanist faith in technical solutions -its enshrinement of the ideas of progress and growth in the space left by the decay of religion -only contrives to unleash its own countervailing forces (or, as Leopold (1966) put it, 'too much safety seems to yield only danger in the long run'). Thus, Ehrenfeld's insight that the organization needed to maintain at least the illusion of progress demands a proliferation of administrators -'a burden upon the real producers in society' -is neatly matched by Oates's revelation that 'in the first two years of the GEF … only $2.8 million was spent on actual biodiversity conservation projects, compared to $20 million spent on administration'! Nevertheless, as Hardin (1968) saw, the step from corrosion to corruption is a short one. The tragedy of the commons (in which 'ruin is the destination to which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest') results from the circumstance in which one is compelled to act selfishly (corrosively) even if ultimately to one's own or future generations' detriment; but of necessity this selfishness will defend itself (corruptingly) against and within systems seeking to control it.
The individual benefits as an individual from his ability to deny the truth even though society as a whole, of which he is a part, suffers … Bureau administrators, trying to evaluate the morality of acts in the total system, are singularly liable to corruption, producing a government by men, not laws (Hardin, 1968) .
So where 'commons' reach carrying capacity, lawlessness replicates itself even among those who would be 'good', since to be good in such contexts is necessarily self-destructive and self-defeating: the tragedy of the commons -or, in modern terminology, the tragedy of shared access to resources -is ineluctably played out. It is, fundamentally, a syndrome resulting from the absence of external terms of reference and constraint, and, before that, the absence of a recognition of the need to communicate in search of a solution.
The result includes the kind of unchecked mismanagement that ultimately leads its landless hungry victims (in a circumstance which is entirely normative in dozens of tropical countries today) to surround protected areas, claiming rights over and demanding access to land that has been (and it is so easy to say the next four words with a contempt bordering on disgust) set aside for animals. Oates responds:
At a national level, the argument that it is immoral to put nature first in certain areas can be countered by a consideration of the relatively small size of these areas. In Ghana, India, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, for instance, less than 5% of the land area is currently set aside in areas where protection of nature is supposed to have priority. Extending existing economic activities over these nominally protected areas, which are mostly land of marginal agricultural value, would not bring substantial long-term national benefits to human populations growing at 2-3% each year. Increases in human well-being on a national scale are much more likely to be promoted by political, social, and economic reform (Oates, 1998 ).
The point is not a new one, but it is a considerable one: put more explicitly, if the exploitative behaviour of people demanding these last areas is unsustainable, then the measures needed to contain that behaviour may as well be taken now, before the areas are yielded up and lost forever, since their yielding up will only buy a few more years before the measures will be needed anyway (Collar, 1986) .
Bearing in mind this depressingly widespread phenomenon, it is instructive to attempt to imagine what this planet is likely to look like in another century, or in another five centuries, or in another millenium. Immediately and inevitably something deeply distasteful and oppressive suggests itself -a world of monocultures and plantations stretching beyond horizons, of tiny depauperate nature reserves (half of them probably maintained by irrigation, half of them serving as municipal theme parks), of cities besieged by their own size and incompetence, of cultures and societies shaped by trivia and compulsion, of lives of immense homogeneity and artifice. We can also attempt to imagine how we would like the planet to be, now and ever after: diverse and rich in species and spaces, patchworked with sprawling, still mysterious nature reserves and generously landscaped farmland, dotted with self-sustaining cities, and inhabited by a rich mix of peoples and traditions, with everything underpinned by a system of mutuality.
If the latter vision seems more appealing than the former, we have to recognize that what is most fundamentally needed is the accession of noneconomic values as the standard against which to permit and direct global development. In effect, this means the full adoption of the trenchant, 'not negotiable' stance taken by Leakey (1997) , who declared (in a passage cited by Oates) that 'nature, like liberty, has no price tag …' and that 'species are priceless, as are human dignity and freedom'. This probably finds widespread assent among conservationists, and among many lay people, but it requires considerable elaboration. The crucial thing, however, is the link Leakey makes with dignity and freedom. Several writers have pondered this area.
A number of times we were asked, Why do you do this thing, this picking up and pickling of little animals? … The lies we tell about our duty and our purposes, the meaningless words of science and philosophy, are walls that topple before a bewildered little 'why'. Finally, we learned to know why we did these things. The animals were very beautiful. Here was life from which we borrowed life and excitement. In other words, we did these things because it was pleasant to do them (Steinbeck, 1958) . Worth in dollars is only an exchange value, like the sale value of a painting or the copyright of a poem. What about the replacement value? Supposing there were no longer any painting, or poetry, or goose music? … If … we can do without goose music, we may as well do away with stars, or sunsets, or Iliads … (Leopold, 1966) .
To the extent that this world surrenders its richness and diversity, it surrenders its poetry. To the extent that it relinquishes its capacity to surprise, it relinquishes its magic. To the extent that it loses its ability to tolerate ridiculous and even dangerous exceptions, it loses its grace (Robbins, 1977) . Fulfilment, excitement, beauty, pleasure, poetry, magic, gracethese are qualities in life which are essentially unmeasurable, have no price tag, no replacement value, and consequently place biodiversity beyond value, or at least beyond valuation in economic terms.
It is useful to have the several references to art. When some years ago a Japanese businessman decided to have himself and his possessions, including a van Gogh, cremated after his death, the shock of the idea ran around the world. The recent Taliban destruction of the great stone buddhas caused a similar recoil. We think of art as a global heritage, irrespective of the circumstance of ownership; its wilful destruction is a culpable vandalism, a distinct and hurtful intrusion into all our lives. You can pay to own it but, as Leopold reflects, you cannot pay to replace it; and in this sense it is not yours to dispose of. So it is with wildlife: we do not expect nations to permit the planetary loss of any species in their care, because the human accident of nationhood that divides up the planet cannot, in an important ultimate sense and irrespective of the legitimacy of sovereignty (the circumstance of ownership), be accepted as the basis of a right to destroy them.
Ironically, the situation does not change even if we do give nature a price tag, so long as its true monetary value is allowed for. By including everything in the calculations, it has been computed that nature's services are worth a conservative US$38 trillion (range 18 -61 trillion) annually (Costanza et al ., 1997 ; adjusted for the year 2000). Since we could not possibly afford such services even if we had the technological capacity to substitute them (Bibby, 2002) , they are, in essence, no less beyond value than if we refused them any monetary recognition whatsoever -they are, in every sense, totally irreplaceable. All the same, a recent calculation that the net cost to 'the human enterprise' of a single year's habitat conversion now runs at US$250 billion for that and every subsequent year into the future (Balmford et al ., 2002) ought to be enough to focus every mind on the urgent and complete reformulation of the global development agenda.
Biodiversity is an expression of the possible. Celebrating the possible is the fundament of life. The celebration ultimately takes place in the most important and distinctive of places, the human mind, that indefinable space where the capacity to contemplate and wonder allows us the measure of ourselves in the universe. Only the freedom of the mind can bring us what we look on as fulfilment. Writing of the lost Passenger Pigeon, Leopold (1966) wrote: 'The gadgets of industry bring us more comforts than the pigeons did, but do they add as much to the glory of the spring?' Writing of the Canarian Houbara, Bannerman (1922) lamented: 'It will be a thousand pities if it becomes extinct, as it is amongst the most interesting examples of adaptation to physical environment'. One can hardly find a more poetic and a more prosaic viewpoint to juxtapose, and yet Bannerman's notion of interest is quite as legitimate as Leopold's rich exaltation. Both are expressions of the freedom of the mind -one might better call it the imagination, the creative dimension of mind -where feelings that come from the 'heart' interplay with ideas reeled off in the brain, things which we must ultimately acknowledge to be as much at risk as anything else in the current extinction crisis.
The diminishment of nature is the diminishment of man. Extinction is the negation of the possible; it creates poverty in the mind. Our capacity to experience, to imagine, to contemplate, erodes with the erosion of nature, and with it we forfeit piecemeal -landscape by landscape, site by site, species by species -the freedom of mind which yet we cherish as ultimately the greatest feature of our human identity. This is not to say that we should never seek to provide justifications for conservation based on precise, measurable benefits to mankind at whatever scale. It is, however, to say that we should also and primarily have the courage and honesty to assert that the reason biodiversity matters is because it confers on us an imprecise, unmeasurable and immeasurable well-being that is located in the spirit rather than in the wallet.
Honesty, after all, brings its own authenticity. The universal loathing of corruption, which is socially divisive and a predictable upshot of the tragedy of the commons, is evidence of the respect in which people throughout the world hold truth, the one great undebasable currency. Being honest at least gives the conservation advocate a real chance of earning such respect, and thereby of building a bond of real trust between people. By the same token, it is only when the political institutions of this planet legally enshrine a permanent, quasiabsolute value for nature -a noneconomic, non-negotiable value based on our shared sense of the importance of nature to the human mind -that we will have the framework and basis for a new era of ethically driven global governance.
